WHAT IS DEGISMISISM?

Degismisism is a conceptual approach proposed by Ali Değişmiş, organized around the question: “What justifies change?” Its central thesis is that change is not progress merely because it occurs. Revising a judgment, retaining a view provisionally, and suspending judgment pending further evidence each require appropriate justification.

The approach does not demand constant change. Instead, it asks which claim should change, on what evidence, to what extent, and why. Retaining an existing judgment should likewise rest on reasons rather than habit or authority alone.

THE CONCEPTUAL CORE

An assessable knowledge claim is a proposition whose sources, supporting evidence and counterarguments can be examined, even when its truth has not yet been established. At the first stage, the content of the claim is distinguished from confidence in it. Confidence may rise or fall with new information; such adjustment does not automatically mean that the judgment has been accepted or abandoned.

At the second stage, three reasoned options are considered:
1. Revise: Reliable new evidence or a better explanation justifies changing the existing view.
2. Retain: The existing position remains better supported than competing accounts, while remaining open to further correction.
3. Suspend judgment: Available evidence is insufficient or incommensurable for a responsible conclusion.

Confidence updating and the resulting judgment are different stages. Thus, lowering confidence from 80% to 55% and suspending judgment are compatible actions, not contradictory outcomes.

THE JUSTIFICATION MATRIX AND META-CORRECTION

The framework examines the claim, confidence, correction, methodological review and public auditability together. Its proposed Justification Matrix prompts structured consideration of evidence quality, source reliability, alternative explanations, uncertainty, verification costs and decision consequences. The matrix is not yet a validated or standardized scientific instrument.

When methodological failures recur, or a single strong finding seriously undermines an evaluation method, the method of assessing evidence may need review, not merely the answer. This is termed meta-correction. A new method is not automatically better: its additional reliability must be assessed on independent cases.

SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

Degismisism concerns knowledge claims assessable by evidence and reasoning. It does not attempt to adjudicate the truth of personal or religious faith. When philosophical literature uses “belief” as a technical term, that terminology is preserved in its original context. The framework is not presented as an independently validated scientific theory, a proven improvement over existing approaches, or a peer-reviewed philosophical school.

The preprint describes seven research hypotheses, a two-stage decision structure and methods for future comparative evaluation. H6 and H7 are exploratory proposals focused on justified retention and appropriate suspension of judgment. Their empirical success has not been established.

PUBLICATION AND SOURCES

DGS-Y1.0 is the first conceptual publication version, with Turkish and English manuscripts under one DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23877575. The clickable Zenodo record appears in the “Sources and archive records” section below. An earlier Internet Archive record dated October 30, 2026 documents prior public materials; it does not itself establish empirical validity or academic endorsement.

FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF DEGISMISISM

1. Priority of justification: A change is evaluated by the evidence and reasons supporting it.
2. No automatic superiority of novelty: Being new does not make an account more accurate.
3. Justified retention: A well-supported judgment may be provisionally retained without rejecting future evidence.
4. Suspension of judgment: Withholding a conclusion may be better than unwarranted certainty when evidence is inadequate.
5. Calibrated confidence: Expressed confidence should reflect the strength of the available evidence.
6. Meta-correction: The method used to evaluate evidence is itself open to justified revision.
7. Proportionate inquiry: Verification effort should fit the stakes, risks and costs of the decision.
8. Transparent reasoning: Important revisions and retention decisions should have grounds open to scrutiny when appropriate.
9. Openness to criticism: The rules of Degismisism must themselves remain revisable when stronger arguments arise.

Concise formulation: “Change without justification is not automatically progress; retention without justification is not knowledge.”